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ABSTRACT 
This  study  assesses  storage  and  trade  of wheat  in  an  integrated  global  economy. 
Domestic and  international linkages are  analyzed using a dynamic rational expectations model 
of  the  world  wheat  market.  The  results  of  this  study  demonstrate  the  importance  of 
endogenizing both storage and trade in studying commodity markets.  Results suggest an optimal 
US buffer stock level of 150 million bushel.  Results indicate that past government stockholdings 
have not followed efficient market outcomes.  Private markets  likely  would perform better in 
the  absence of government market distortions.  Results  indicate that elimination of the  Export 
Enhancement Program by the  US  and of export restitution payments by the  EU is  unlikely to 
have a major impact on wheat exports from the two regions, but will save millions of tax dollars 
in both regions. WHEAT BUFFER STOCKS AND TRADE IN  AN EFFICIENT 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
The  Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),  United 
States (US) farm bills (1985, 1990), and European Union (EU) MacSherry reforms are steering 
the  world  wheat  market towards  greater  reliance  on market  forces.  Major  grain  producing 
countries  including Argentina,  Australia,  and  Canada are  liberalizing trade  and  implementing 
market-oriented  farm  policies.  These  global,  regional,  and  domestic  policy  reforms  have 
promoted  freer  movement  of goods  and  services,  and  have  made  world  economies  more 
interdependent. 
Global equilibrium trade models can be used to analyze trade flows among regions under 
the  new  regime,  but most are  not dynamic and  fail  to  reflect the  role of storage  in smoothing 
trade flows (Bigman and Reutlinger, 1979; Bailey. 1989; Roningen, 1989:  Tyers and Anderson. 
1992; Johnson et al.,  1993; Makki et al.,  1994).  Trade  is  not necessarily  a "one shot game" 
as  assumed by  static trade models.  With storage possible.  the amount traded depends not only 
on current consumption and  production but also on past and  expected future  consumption and 
production. 
The  modern  theory  of storage  provides  a  detailed  assessment  of domestic  market 
dynamics.  However,  it  fails  to  endogenize  trade  flows  among  countries  (Gustafson.  1958: 
Wright and Williams,  1982;  Miranda  and  HeImberger,  1988;  Miranda  and  Glauber.  1993). 
Modern commodity storage  models  have  been developed  to  study  public and  private  storage 
behavior exclusively in closed economies. 
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An increasingly interdependent and commercial world food market calls for an assessment 
of world wheat market (WWM) within a framework combining both storage and trade. Storage 
and  trade  are  alternative  means  to  smooth  domestic  prices  and  consumption  in  the  face  of 
unstable  domestic  production.  In  an  integrated  global  market  storage  and  trade  respond 
simultaneously to  food and feed  shortage or surplus and to policy changes.  Therefore, storage 
and  trade  flows  from  one  country  cannot  be  deduced  independently  of storage  and  trade  in 
another country. 
Relatively  few  nations account for a dominant share  of the  WWM expons and buffer 
stockholdings.  The US  and the EU together account for just over 50 percent of world expons, 
over 30 percent of world wheat stocks, and for an even larger percent of wheat buffer stocks. 
The present study analyzes the  WWM  dominated by  the  US  and the  EU  in the context of the 
post Uruguay Round of the GATT.  Domestic and  international  linkages in buffer stocks  and 
trade  are  investigated using  a dynamic  rational expectations  model  of the  WW~.  The  next 
section presents the conceptual model and the solution procedure. 
I.  THE MARKET MODEL 
This  section  presents  a  "three-region"  world  wheat  market  consisting  of  two  net 
exporters. the US  and the EU, and one net importer, the combined rest-of-the-world (hereafter 
referred to as  RW).  Trade is  assumed to  occur between exporters and  the  importer.  with no 
trade between the two exporters.  For ease of exposition. the model is  presented in two pans. 
The first  part presents the model  for exporters.  while the  second part presents  the  model  for 
RW. 3 
A.  Exporters 
The  following  conceptual  model  outlines  market characteristics  of the  two  exporting 
entities,  the  US  and  EU.  The  framework  of supply,  demand,  and  arbitrage  conditions  are 
similar between the US  and the EU. 
Material  Balance.  The  available supply  in country  i in period t  (~i) is  composed of 
current production (Qt') plus the carryover from the last period (SI~l)'  The country must allocate 
At
i  among  consumption  (Ct
i),  storage  (Sti),  and  exports  (~i).  The  resulting  intertemporal 
connection and equilibrium are summarized in the following material balance equation: 
(1)  Q i  Si  Ai  C i  Si  i 
I  +  1-1  ::  ~  ::  I  +  I  +  ~  ,  'i  i  ::  US,EU. 
The state variable At
i  reflects the state of the economy, which summarizes all the  relevant past 
and  current  information.  This  specification assumes  no  losses  in  storage  and  no  qualitative 
differences between the stored commodity and the freshly  harvested commodity. 
Consumption Demand.  Current consumption, feed,  and seed use  in country i (Ctl)  is  a 
downward sloping function of current market price (Pt')  : 
(2)  C i::  i(p i)Bi 
t  IX  I  '  'i  i  ::  US,EU 
where  ci > 0  is  the  constant term  and  Bi < 0  is  the  price  elasticity  of demand.  Consumers' 
income is  assumed to be constant in both the US  and the  EU
l
. 
I  Even if income changed over time and the income elasticity were included in the demand function. 
the effects would not be large because of the low income elasticity of demand for wheat consumption in 
both the US and the EU. 4 
Production.  The current production in country i (Qt
i
)  equals the acreage planted in the 
preceding year  (Lt~l) times a random yield per acre (Y/)  : 
(3)  =  US,EU. 
The acreage planted by  rational  producers  in country  i  (~') depends  on the price expected to 
Prevail at harvest time ( E P i 1)  : 
t  t-
(4)  = US,EU  , 
where  a'  >  0 is  the constant tenn and  "i >  0  is  the  price elasticity of supply  in country i. 
Yield is assumed to be random with a known probability distribution.  Neither serial correlation 
in yield within the region nor contemporaneous correlation in yields across  regions  is  present. 
This  specification  is  intended  to  capture  the  two  salient  features  of agricultural  production: 
production lags and future production uncertainty. 
Storage.  Storage is carried out by expected profit maximizing arbitragers.  Competition 
among the risk-neutral stock holders eliminates speculative profits. yielding the following inter-
temporal arbitrage condition!: 
(5)  'ri  i  =  US,EU 
2  If there  are  efficient  futures  markets,  then  risk attitudes  of stockholders  will  not  affect  their 
stocld,clding behavior.  Risk  attitude will  affect  only  their positions  in  the  futures  market,  not  their 
storage  behavior.  Growing  evidence  that  risk  premiums  are  small  in  futures  markets  allows  risk 
neutrality  as  a reasonable  assumption (Frankel,  1984;  Miranda and  HeImberger,  1988;  Williams  and 
Wright,  1991) 5 
where  Oi  =  (1 +  rl)"1  is  the annual discount factor when the annual interest rate  is  ri,  E (P i  ) 
t  r  + 1 
is  the expectation of Pt~l  '  conditional on the infonnation available in period t,  and k'(St')  is 
the  marginal  cost of storage.  The  intertemporal  arbitrage  condition (5)  implies  that,  at  the 
margin. the expected gain from holding an additional unit of stock is equal to the cost of holding 
it.  Economic  profit gained from  stockholding  is  presumed  to  cause  individuals and  finns to 
pursue additional storage.  This decreases expected gains and increases marginal costs, bringing 
equilibrium between marginal benefits and marginal costs. 
The  discount rate  represents  the  opportunity cost of funds  tied  up  in  holding  stocks. 
Storage costs, on the other hand,  include cost of handling, the rental value of storage space, and 
insurance against theft or damage.  The marginal cost of storage  is  specified as  an increasing 
function of amount stored: 
(6)  =  US,EU 
where kl  and kl  are parameters.  This specification of the  marginal cost function allows  for a 
convenience yield to storage, which represents the amount commodity processors are willing to 
pay to have a stable supply (Kaldor, 1939; Working,  1948, 1949; Brennan,  1958)3.  Figure 3.1 
depicts the marginal cost-of-storage function.  In times of short supplies,  the current price (PJ 
may exceed the discounted expected price for the next year (or  EtPt+l) such that there may not 
be  any  incentive  for  speculative  carryout.  When  this  occurs,  processors  will  still  hold 
contingency or working stocks to smooth production and avoid unnecessary adjustment costs. 
A  more  general  condition  is  when  stocks  are  held  at  less  than  full  carrying  charges.  which 
Working termed a negative price of  storage. 6 
Storage 
Figure 1.  Supply of Storage 
International  Trade.  International  trade  is  undertaken  by  private  traders  who  exploit 
spatial  arbitrage  profit  opportUnities.  Competition  among  such  traders  eliminates  excess 
arbitrage profits.  ~et exports from country i  (~I)  to RW are a function of the market prices 
in both the regions. per unit shipping costs (t), and the per unit export subsidy provided by the 
government (gl).  Trade is  subject to  the  following spatial arbitrage condition: 
(7)  pi  +  t i - gi  =  prw 
t  t  ~i >  0 
pi  +  t i  - gi  ~  prw 
t  t  ~i =0  Tf  i  =  US,EU. 
Equation (7) says that, if the buying cost plus shipping cost less government subsidy exceeds the 
selling price in RW, then no  trade  will take place.  This also  implies that trade takes place in 
one direction only,  from either the  US  or the EU to  RW. 7 
B.  Rest of the World 
Rest-of-the-world  is  assumed  to  be  a large  consumer  with no  significant buffer stock 
holdings.  It is  assumed to  represent the  world wheat import market where the  US  and the EU 
compete to  sell wheat.  RW  is  represented by a stochastic net demand function. 
Consumption Demand.  Current consumption in the rest of the world (Ctrw)  is a function 
of current market price  (Plrw)  : 
(8) 
where  the  random  variable  utrw  is  assumed  to  be  normally  distributed  with  mean  zero  and 
variance  cf.  Expression  (8)  is  a  net demand  function.  The  random  component,  therefore, 
accounts for variation coming from both the  supply and the demand side. 
Market  Clearing  Condition.  The  model  is  closed  by  assuming  the  following  market 
clearing condition: 
(9)  X
U!  Xeu  c rw 
t  +  t  :::  t  ' 
where  the  sum of exports from the  US  and the  EU  is equal to  total consumption in the rest of 
the  world. 
c.  Model Parameterization 
The specific parameters presented in Table 1 are representative of the US,  the EU, and 
RW wheat sectors.  Econometric studies indicate that the price elasticity of domestic demand for 
wheat in the two exporting regions is approximately  -0.2 (Reutlinger, 1976; Rojko et al., 1978; 
Gardner,  1979; Sarris and Freebaim, 1983; Tyers and Anderson,  1986; Bailey, 1989; Sullivan 
et al., 1989).  The price elasticities of demand for major importers, as  listed in Sullivan et al., Table 1.  ~Iodel Parameters 
The US  The EU  RW 
Price elasticity of demand  -0.20  -0.20  -0.31 
Constant term for demand function  6.40  10.40  36.00 
Price elasticity of supply  0.30  0.30  a 
Constant term for  supply function  0.04  0.03  a 
Yield (bu per acre)  40.00  66.00  a 
CV of yieldb (%)  10.00  10.00  a 
Shipping cost ($ per bushel)  0.50  0.50  a 
Annual interest rate (%)  7.00  7.00  a 
Storage function parameters:  kl  0.40  0.40  a 
k~  0.20  0.20  a 
aNot  relevant for RW;  bCV  is coefficient of variation obtained by  dividing 
standard deviation by  mean. 
8 
are as follows:  -0"+0 for North Africa, Middle East, and Southeast Asia; -0.25 for former Soviet 
Union:  -0.10 for China; and -0.25 for the  rest of the  world.  For the  present study,  the price 
elasticity of demand for RW  is  estimated to  be  -0.31, which is  a weighted average of major 
importers. 
Wheat supply elasticity estimates for the US  and the EU reported in the literature vary 
widely.  Sarris and Freebaim (1983) estimated a short-run wheat supply elasticity of 0.2 for the 
US and 0.35 for the EU; while OEeD (1986) estimates were 0.5 and 0.46, respectively for the 




.  Sensitivity analysis  is performed to  evaluate  results  under alternative demand  and 
supply elasticity estimates.  The constant terms for demand and supply functions were derived 
using 1989-93 average price and consumption and are presented in Table 1.  The random yields 
both in the US and the EU are assumed to be independently and identically distributed following 
a log-normal distribution with an estimated mean of 40 and 66 bushels per acre,  respectively, 
and an  identical coefficient of variation (CV) of 10 percenrs. 
Choosing the appropriate interest rate is crucial because it represents the opportunity cost 
of holding stocks.  Competitive stockholders must receive  a rate  of return on their activity at 
least equal to  their opportunity cost.  Malkeil (1990), after an extensive review of the financial 
literature,  concluded  that  the  real  rate  of return  on long-term  assets- in  the  US  is  about  10 
percent.  This  rate of return.  however.  cannot be directly used as  the  relevant rate of interest. 
Gardner (1979. p.  126) suggested that the appropriate discount rate must reflect a post-tax rate 
of return
6
.  Assuming a tax rate  of 30 percent.  the  appropriate  rate  of interest is  estimated to 
be 7 percent.  In the present study, 7 percent is used as the real rate of interest in both regions. 
Storage cost function parameters are chosen such that the non-interest cost of storage lies 
near 10 percent of the price during normal production.  International shipping costs are assumed 
to  be  $0.50 per bushel,  which is  approximately equal to  12.5 percent of the current price of 
4  Gardner (1979) also used a supply elasticity of 0.3 for the  US  wheat. 
5  CV is  standard deviation divided by  mean.  The estimated CV s  of yield for the period 1980-93 
were respectively 8.5 and  12 percent for the US and the EU.  Tweeten (1994) and Ray et al.  (1994) also 
report similar variance levels for the  US and the EU, respectively. 
6  Gardner's formula is  as  follows:  r  =  R(1-t) - P,  where r is the  relevant nominal interest rate,  R 
is the pretax nominal rate of return, t is the tax rate, and P is the rate of inflation.  In the present study, 
however,  R is  real  rate of return and,  therefore, the inflation factor is  ignored. 10 
$4.00 per bushel  (FAO predicts  average  shipping costs  to  be  10  to  15  percent of the  price). 
Export subsidies  range  from  $0.40 to  $0.60 per bushel  (US  GAO,  1994).  Similar parameter 
estimates are assumed in the EU.  The random shock variable ~  in the RW demand function is 
assumed to  be  normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation 0.1. 
D.  Dynamic Rational Expectations Equilibria 
The goal here is  to  solve the market model (1) through (9) for the equilibrium functions 
of price,  storage.  exports,  and  acreage  for  the  given  set  of parameters.  Producers  and 
stockholders, whose current actions are based on future prices, are assumed to be rational in the 
sense of Muth (1960).  The rational expectations hypothesis implies that rational agents make 
forecasts consistent with those of the underlying economic model, use all available information 
efficiently in  making decisions,  and do  not  make systematic errors.  The rational expectations 
hypothesis  establishes  a  connection  between  the  beliefs  of individual  agents  and  the  actual 
stochastic behavior of the system.  Solving a rational expectations model, thus,  involves finding 
an equilibrium stochastic process for all  the endogenous variables.  The forecasts generated by 
this  process  will  then be  equal  to  the  expectations  that  appear  in  the  model.  In this  sense 
expectations are  internally consistent with the  model (Sheffrin,  1983). 
The structural model developed in this study asserts that prices are related to conditional 
expectations.  For example, if it  was  predicted that prices would rise by  10 percent by  the end 
of the  year,  stockholders  would  accumulate  stocks  until  the  expected  marginal  returns  from 
holding stocks equates the cost of storage.  Thus no patterns established from past behavior can 
ever be used to predict future price behavior.  The study uses stochastic dynamic programming 
to solve for the equilibrium stochastic process of endogenous variables.  The inability of storage 11 
to  work backwards  introduces a  nonlinearity  into  the  system  requiring  numerical  methods  to 
implement the  stochastic dynamic programming7. 
The polynomial projection and collocation method is  used to  solve for the  competitive 
equilibrium  conditions  (Judd,  1991;  Miranda,  1994;  Miranda  and  Glauber.  1993).  In  this 
method  the  expected  price  functions  are  approximated  using  a  Chebychev  polynomial  and 
conditional expectations are computed using Gaussian quadratures.  The equilibrium functions 
are computed by successive approximation and the steady state values and the dynamic paths are 
generated by  the Monte Carlo simulation method.  For details see Makki (1995). 
II.  STORAGE-TRADE INTERDEPENDENCE 
The introduction of storage into a trade model alters the relationship between supply and 
demand,  and.  hence,  price  behavior.  The  dynamic  rational  expectations  model  explicitly 
recognizes that the market as a whole cannot carry negative stocks, thus introducing nonlinearity 
in the supply-storage relationship.  This nonlinearity extends itself to price-quantity relationships 
shown with and  without storage  in Figure 2.  The quantity on the horizontal  a:'{is  is  composed 
of demand  for  consumption,  storage,  and  exports.  The  nonlinearity  in  the  price-quantity 
relationship  occurs  at the  point at which storage  first  occurs  (Ao).  The figure  indicates that 
endogenizing storage in a trade model augments the demand curve and makes price less sensitive 
to  quantity changes. 
7  The impossibility of  carrying forward negative stocks imposes a non-negativity constraint on stocks. 
which  has  been  an  important  feature  of more  recent  literature on commodity  storage  (Miranda  and 






II  i 
1 i  ! 
I 
I 
o~  ______________________________  ~i 
1.8  2.0  2.2  2.4  2.8  2.8  3.0  3.2  3.4 
US supply (0,+8.., in bil. bu) 
Note:  EU wheat supply is held constant at 2.4 bil. bu. 
Figure 2.  Equilibrium Price Functions for US  Wheat With (I) and Without (m 
Storage 
The steady-state distributions of price and consumption were also different in the absence 
of storage (Table 2).  For example, with no storage possible, the coefficient of variation of price 
was 35 percent compared to 20 percent when storage is endogenous.  The coefficient of variation 
of consumption was also lower with storage (3 percent) than without storage (7 percent).  Thus, 
storage helps to  stabilize both price and consumption. 
Another result, evident from Table 2,  is  that the coefficient of variation of price in the 
Importing region RW  is lower with storage (17 percent) compared to  no storage (30 percent) in 
the two exporting countries.  Results also  indicate that RW  consumers,  on average,  pay more 
when no  storage  is  undertaken in the two exporting countries.  The coefficient of variation of 13 
consumption in RW  was  5 percent with storage and  10 percent without storage.  Thus storage 
in exporting countries provides an externality in the form of more stable consumption and lower 
and more stable prices for importers. 
Table  2.  Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation (CV)  of Price,  Consumption, 







Consumption (mil.  bu) 
Storage (mil. bu) 
Exports (mil.  bu) 
Acreage (mil.  acre) 
Production (mil.  bu) 
Price ($/bu) 
Consumption (mil. bu) 
Storage (mil.  bu) 
Exports (mil.  bu) 
Acreage  (mil. acre) 
Production (mil.  bu) 
Price ($/bu) 
Consumption (mil.  bu) 
Note:  os.  No storage. 
With Storage  Without Storage 
..............................  u  .....................................  ............................................................ 
Mean  CV(%)  Mean  CV(%) 
3.38  19.57  3.44  34.85 
1256.76  3.40  1264.93  6.89 
148.93  80.43  ns  ns 
1177.32  17.51  1187.02  19.49 
60.50  1.03  60.89  2.31 
2437.91  12.15  2453.66  12.01 
3.38  19.57  3.44  34.85 
1301. 76  3.40  1310.22  6.89 
148.93  80.43  ns  ns 
1046.80  19.37  1056.15  21.27 
38.89  1.02  39.15  2.01 
2350.99  12.20  2366.18  12.06 
17.05  3.94  3.88 
2224.13  4.89  2243.19 
30.43 
9.85 14 
A.  Competitive Storage 
Total stockholdings in an economy can be divided into three types:  (i) Buffer stocks are 
held  to  provide  for contingencies  (precautionary  motive) and  to  take  advantage of unforseen 
(speculative) opportunities to  make  profits:  (ii) seasonal  stocks  are  generally held  to  smooth 
consumption from one harvest to  the next:  and  (iii) pipeline stocks are  held by distributors of 
the commodity in transit. in processing.  and on store shelves.  The present study estimates only 
buffer stockholdings.  Seasonal and pipeline stocks have little impact on market behavior in the 
long-run and hence are not analyzed in this study.  However, pipeline stocks must be added to 




Table 2 suggests an optimal buffer stock level of 150 million bushels  in  the  US  if the 
coefficient of production is  10 percent and discount factor is 7 percent in both the US and in the 
EC.  This  level  will  change  depending  on  the  domestic  and  foreign  level  of production 
instability.  interest  rates,  and  government  commodity  programs
9
.  For  example,  a  US-EU 
coefficient of variation of production of 15  percent with zero discount rate  calls for  US  wheat 
buffer stocks  of 262  million bushels - a figure  close to  actual numbers  from  1991  to  1994  if 
pipeline stocks are included. 
Figure 3 indicates the competitive eqUilibrium storage levels for the CS under alternative 
supply levels in the EU.  This relationship, generally referred to  as  a "rule"  in the commodity 
8  Tweeten (1994) estimated a pipeline stock level of 250 million bushels of wheat in the lIS in 1991-
92. 
9  Gardner  (1979)  in  his  analysis  of US  wheat  market  indicated  that  in  a  free  market  with  no 
government storage, the private sector, on average,  would hold a speculative stock level of 180 million 
bushels of wheat. 15 
storage literature, explains the' functional relationship between economic states and equilibrium 
levels  of stocks.  For example,  the  competitive storage  rule  indicates  that,  with  a beginning 
supply in the  US  of 2.6 billion bushels,  a profit maximizing,  rational competitive US  storage 
industry would hold  167  million bushels in buffer stocks when the available supply in the  EU 
is 2.4 billion bushels and would hold 303  million bushels when the available supply in the EU 
is  2.8 billion bushels (Figure 3).  If  the  beginning supply  in  the  US  were  3.0 billion bushels. 
competitive stockholding would be 303 and 445 million bushels, respectively for the above levels 
of supplies  in  the  EU.  These  rules  indicate  that the  buffer stock in  the  US  increases  as  the 
available supply in the EU rises.  Thus stockholdings in the US and the EU are interdependent. 
0.71  ~  3.2-
0.8  / 
jo.s  //2.8 
aO.4  /  2.4 
CrJ 
80.3  % 
"is  2.0 
(JJ  ;:) 0.2 
.  . ...... 
0.1 
o~~-=~-+-==-----------------~ 
1.8  1.8  2.0  2.2  2.4  2.8  2.8  3.0  3.2  3.4  3.8 
US supply (0,+8.., in bil. bu) 
-eU wheat supply in bil. bu. 
Figure 3.  Equilibrium Storage Rules for US Wheat Under Alternative 
Supply Levels in the EU. 16 
Higher levels of supply in the EU reduce the current price  in both the regions,  which in turn 
induces rational stockholders to  accumulate stocks in both regions
lO
• 
The expected equilibrium storage levels generated by this model  approximate the optimal 
level of stockholdings in a well functioning economy.  These results represent the behavior of 
private stockholders maximizing profit or a public stockholding agency minimizing deadweight 
loss to the economy.  The generated rules, therefore. provide the benchmark for both public and 
private buffer stock operations. 
B.  Competitive Trade 
Figure 4 illustrates equilibrium wheat exports from the US under alternative supply le)lels 
in the  ED.  In contrast to equilibrium storage functions,  the equilibrium export functions shift 
downward  (exports  decline)  with  a  larger  EU  supply.  A  larger  EU  supply  diminishes  US 
exports and raises  US  stocks, ceteris paribus.  Thus buffer stocks and exports are substitutes 
when the market is  open and efficient. 
In conclusion, our findings  indicate that equilibrium levels of trade are sensitive to the 
presence of storage.  Having demonstrated the significance of storage-trade interdependence in 
commodity markets. we  now examine how storage and trade respond to policy changes. 
10  In the present study equilibrium stock levels in the US and the EU are simultaneously determined. 
If the EU  were to  hold stocks autonomously, then the  rational  stockholders in  the  US  would decrease 
their stockholdings when the EU  increases its stock level and vice versa. 21 
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Figure 4.  Equilibrium Exports Rules for US  Wheat Under Alternative 
Supply Levels in the EU. 
III.  STORAGE-TRADE RESPONSE TO A REDUCTION IN EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
17 
The  US  government  introduced  the  Export  Enhancement  Program  (EEP)  in  1985  to 
stabilize and  increase exports,  and  to reduce  record stock levels accumulated during the early 
1980s.  The EEP was a counteroffensive strategy to hold market share by countering EU export 
subsidies.  Under the program, government-owned surplus agricultural commodities were made 
available as  bonuses to  US  exporters to  enable them to  lower export prices of US  agricultural 
commodities  and  make  them  competitive  with  subsidized  foreign  exports,  particularly  those 
subsidized by  the  EU (US GAO,  1994). 18 
Since  its  inception in  1985  through March  1994,  over $6.3 billion of US  agricultural 
commodities have been made available as  bonuses  to  eligible US  exports.  Nearly 80%  of the 
EEP budget supported wheat sales during those years. The EEP subsidy during the entire period 
was estimated to average $0.50 per bushel (US GAO,  1994).  In the case of the EU, restitution 
payments to exporters make up the difference between the intervention price and the world price. 
The  net effect of the export restitution payments is  assumed to  be similar to  that of the  EEP. 
According to the recently signed GATT agreement, the quantity of subsidized exports is 
to  be cut by  21  percent, and export subsidy value is  to  be reduced by  36 percent over the next 
six years.'  The wheat subsidy is expected to fall to $0.20 per bushel when the GATT agreement 
is fully  implemented.  Table 3 reports the steady state mean and coefficient of variation of price, 
consumption,  storage,  exports,  acreage,  and  production of wheat  in  response  to  a partial.  a 
unilateral,  and a multilateral removal of the EEP and EU export restitution payments.  Table 4 
presents the estimated economic benetits/losses from such policy shifts.  A 36 percent reduction 
in  export subsidies  in  both regions  is  predicted  to  have  only  a modest  impact on US  exports 
because the US and the EU liberalizations tend to offset each other.  The simulated results show 
that US  wheat exports fall  by  14  million bushels or l.2 percent,  while wheat stocks  rise by  2 
million bushels or l.2 percent (Table 3).  US export revenue is expected to fall by $110 million 
but the  predicted savings  from  a reduced  EEP budget would be  $219 million (Table 4).  CS 
consumers  would gain ($78 million) while producers would lose ($160 million) due  to  partial. 
liberalization.  The GAIT agreement, therefore, would save the US  economy $136 millionll. 
II Results and policy implications for the EU are analogous to that of the US and hence not explicitly 
discussed to save space. 19 
Table 3.  Steady State Mean and Cocl"ficicnt  01'  Variation 01'  Price, Consumption, Storage, Exports, Acrcagc, and I'roductioll of Whcat 
Under Alternative Export Subsidy Policies of thc US alld the Ell. 
('urrent  Pol iLy'  Parlial
b  Unilateral"  Multilateral~ 
....  _  .......... 
Variahles  Mean  eV(%)  Mean  CV(%)  Mean  CV(%)  Mean  CV(%) 
TheUS 
Price ($/bu)  3.51  18.54  3.46  18.93  3.35  1l).76  3.38  19.57 
Consumption (mil. bu)  1246.52  3.24  1250.2lJ  3.30  1258.72  3.42  1256.76  3.40 
Storage (mil.  bu)  144.31  8U)2  14(d)4  80.82  149.79  80.30  148.93  80.43 
Exports (mil. bu)  1215.97  17.26  1201.66  17.35  1170.00  17.55  1177.32  17.51 
Acreage (mil.  acre)  61.22  1.01  60.95  1.01  60.37  1.00  60.50  1.03 
Production (mil. bu)  2466.83  12. \3  2456.0lJ  12.04  2432.45  12.15  2437.91  12.15 
The EU 
Price ($/bu)  3.51  18.55  3.46  18.93  3.48  18.76  3.38  19.57 
Consumption (mil.  bu)  1291.15  3.24  1295.06  3.29  1293.34  3.27  \301.76  3.40 
Storage (miL  bu)  144.31  81.02  146.04  80.81  145.28  80.l)2  148.93  80.43 
Exports (mil.  bu)  1084.7l)  19.01  1070.72  19.14  1076.92  Il) .08  1046.80  19.37 
Acreage (mil.  acre)  39.36  1.01  39.18  1.01  39.26  1.01  38.89  1.02 
Production (mil.  bu)  2378.88  12.18  2368.53  12.18  2373.08  12.18  2350.99  12.20 
RW 
Price ($/bu)  3.51  18.54  3.74  17.9l)  3.76  17.76  3.88  17.05 
Consumption (mil.  bu)  23(J(U8  5.30  2172.3l)  5.15  2246.92  5.01  2224.13  4.89 
'Current  policy  uses  an  export  subsidy  of $0.50 per  bushel  in  both  regions;  bBoth  the  US  and  Ell  LUt  export suhsidy  value  hy  36%;  'The  LIS 
unilaterally eliminates the  EEP and the  Ell cuts hy  36%;  ~No export subsidies in either region. 20 











































Consumer Surplus  - 1331.80  - 1430.49  - 2087.91 
aBoth the  CS  and the  EU  cut export subsidy value by  36 percent. 
bThe US  unilaterally eliminates the EEP and the EU cuts export subsidy value by 36 percent. 
eNo  export subsidies in either region. 
What if the  EU  adheres  to  the  GA TT  requirements  of 36  percent  reduction in export 
subsidies and the C'S unilaterally removes all export subsidies?  Unilateral elimination of export 
subsidies by the US  would decrease its exports by 4 percent and increase its stocks by 4 percent 
from  the  current policy  (Table  3).  US  wheat prices  would  fall  by  16  cents per bushel or 5 
percent  while  consumption  would  increase  by  12  million bushels  or  1  percent.  Unilateral 
removal of export subsidies would benefit consumers ($252 million) and cost producers ($510 
million).  But it would save the  US  economy $350 million (Table 4). 21 
Results show that multilateral elimination of export subsidies would decrease US exports 
by  3 percent and increase wheat stocks by  3 percent (Table 3).  The difference between results 
from unilateral versus multilateral removal of export subsidies  is  small.  Results  also indicate 
that the domestic price of wheat would decrease by 4 percent while conslJmption would increase 
by  1 percent after the subsidies are completely eliminated.  The world price is predicted to  rise 
slightly  and  become  less  volatile.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  some  of the  previous 
literature  examining  the  efficacy  of EEP  (Bailey  and  Houck,  1990;  Brooks,  Devadoss  and 
Meyers,  1990; Seitzinger and Paarlberg, 1990).  Bailey and Houck, using a dynamic nonspatial 
equilibrium  model  of world  wheat  market,  indicated  that  the  EEP  plays  a  minor  role.in 
expanding US  exports.  Seitzinger and Paarlberg attributed 2 to 3 percent expansion in expons 
to  the  EEP. 
Table 4 shows that producers are less worse off with multilateral compared to unilateral 
policy change.  Cnilateral more than multilateral elimination of all export subsidies dampens the 
domestic  price.  The  net  benefit  to  the  US  economy  from  multilateral  removal  of export 
subsidies is estimated to be 5394 million.  Results also show the  inefficiency of the EEP.  Each 
EEP dollar  increases  US  exports  by  only  $0.50.  Thus  deficiency  payments  paid  directly  to 
producers are more cost-effective than export subsidies in  raising farm income. 
The foregoing analysis reveals the dynamic response of storage and trade to the EEP and 
EU restitution payments  in  the  face  of changing  market conditions.  The results  suggest that 
elimination of export subsidies will not have a major impact on world wheat trade but will save 
millions of dollars for taxpayers. .,.., 
--" 
IV.  STORAGE-TRADE RESPONSE TO INTEREST RATES 
This  section examines the  impact of changes  in  real  interest  rates  (discount rates)  on 
storage  and  trade.  The  discount  rate  accounts  for  the  risk  and  opportunity cost  of holding 
stocks.  For a given level of supply, private storage will tend to be larger the lower the discount 
rate.  High discount rates constrain private sector stock holding. 
Table 5 reports the steady-state properties of selected endogenous variables for different 
interest  rates.  Results  show  that  the  steady-state  storage  in  the  US  decreased  by  29  million 
bushels or 19 percent when the interest rate  increased from 7 to  10 percent.  When the storage 
level  decreases  the  market  becomes  more  volatile.  The  coefficient  of variation  of prices 
increased by 2 percentage points  in all three regions in response to  ali  increase in interest rate 
from  7 to  10  percent.  The coefficient of variation  in  consumption,  however,  changes  little. 
Consumption in both the US  and the EU declined by a million bushel each, while consumption 
in  RW  increased by  2 million bushels.  The small changes in mean and CV of consumption is 
because  of low  elasticity  of demand  for  wheat  in  the  US  and  in the  EU.  US  wheat expons 
increased by  a million bushel in response to  an increase in interest rate  from  7 to  10 percent. 
Figure 5 graphs the steady state mean stocks in the US  for different interest rates.  The 
propensity to hold buffer stocks decreases as the interest rate increases.  Mean stocks decreased 
from 225  million bushels  to  120  million bushels  in response  to  an increase in the  interest rate 
from zero to 10 percent in the US and EU.  Lower stock levels increase market price volatility. 
Figure 6 shows the relationship between the world interest rate and the CV of US wheat prices. 
The  CV of price  increased  from  15  percent  to  22  percent  in  response  to  an  increase  in  the 
interest rate from  zero to  10 percent in all  regions of the world. 23 
Table 5.  Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation of Price, Consumption, Storage, Exports. 
Acreage. and Production of Wheat Under Alternative Interest Ratesa• 
Interest Rates 
3 percent  7 percent  10  percent  ........................................................  .  ..............................................  .................................................. 
Variables  Mean  CV  (%)  Mean  CV (%)  Mean  CV  (%) 
liS 
Price (Sibu)  3.37  17.19  3.38  19.57  3.39  21.64 
Consumption (mil.  bu)  1256.04  3.01  1256.76  3.40  1257.45  3.74 
Storage (mil.  bu)  188.93  70.81  148.93  80.43  119.92  89.81 
Exports (mil.  bu)  1176.30  17.30  1177.32  17.50  1178.15  17.70 
Acreage  (mil.  ac)  60.48  0.91  60.50  1.03  60.53  1. 11 
Production (mil.  ac)  2436.95  12.15  2437.91  12.15  2439.05  12.14 
EU 
Price (S/bu)  3.37  17.19  3.38  19.57  3.38  21.64 
Consumption (mil.  bu)  1301.02  3.01  1301.76  3.40  1302.48  3.74 
Storage (mil.  bu)  188.93  70.81  148.93  80.43  119.92  89.81 
ExportS  (mil.  bu)  1046.00  19.20  1046.80  19.37  1047.65  19.52 
Acreage  (mil. bu)  38.88  0.89  38.89  1.02  38.91  1.11 
Production (mil.  bu)  2350.07  12.20  2350.99  12.20  2352.09  12.19 
RW 
Price ($/bu)  3.87  14.97  3.88  17.05  3.88  18.86 
Consumption (mil.  bu)  2222.32  4.34  2224.13  4.89  2225.82  5.39 
'Interest rates are  equal and change simultaneously in all  regions. =1 
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Underlying discount factors  can differ between public and private storage, chiefly due 
to the differences in opportunity costs of capital and risks  involved in maintaining stocks.  The 
discount factor is lower for public stocks because the public sector can spread its risks over time. 
over many investments,  and over the entire taxpaying population such that each citizen would 
bear only a negligible share of the total risk.  Private stockholders require higher rates of return 
to  compensate for high perceived risks of stockholding.  Private stockholders are likely to  pay 
higher  interest  rates  on  borrowed  funds  and  often  face  attractive  alternative  investment 
opportunities.  Hence the lower public discount rate justifies holding more stocks than would the 
private sector.  However, the potential social gain from public stockholdings must be  balanced 
against the shortcomings of public stocks.  The public sector may mismanage stocks as evident 
from excessive grain stocks gathered by  US  commodity programs in past years. 
Assuming an interest rate of 3 percent for the public sector, the estimated efficient stock 
level  was  189  million  bushels,  or about  27  percent  higher  than  stocks  held  solely  by  the 
competitive market at an interest rate of 7 percent (Table 5).  Private stockholding may  also  be 
reduced  by  the  prospect of unpredictable  government intervention  in  markets  in  response  to 
political pressures. 
Table 6 illustrates how increases in interest rates in one country affect equilibrium price. 
consumption. storage,  exports,  acreage,  and production in  all  regions.  This analysis assesses 
the impact of increases in the interest rates in the US in 1994 and 1995, ceteris paribus.  Results 
indicate that buffer stocks in the US decrease by 31  percent, while stocks in the ED increase by 
12  percent when the interest rate in the US  is  increased from 7 to  10 percent, holding the 26 
Table 6.  Impact of Higher US  Interest Rates on World Wheat Markefl. 
Interest Rates 
8 percentb  9 percent  10 percent  .......................................................  ,  .................................................  .  ............................................... 
Variables  Mean  CV  (%)  Mean  CV  (%)  Mean  CV  (%) 
VS 
Price (5/bu)  3.37  19.93  3.38  20.25  3.38  20.52 
Consumption (mil.  bu)  1256.88  3A5  1156.99  3.50  1157.09  3.55 
Storage (mil. bu)  132.18  82.39  11 i.OO  84.26  103.27  86.07 
Exports (mil. bu)  1177.61  17.69  1177.87  17.91  1178.11  18.15 
Acreage (mil. ac)  60.51  1.01  60.51  1.01  60.52  1.01 
Production (mil.  ac)  2438.10  12.15  2438.28  12.15  2438.45  12.14 
EU 
Price ($/bu)  3.38  19.93  3.38  20.25  3.38  20.52 
Consumption (mil. bu)  1301.86  3.45  1301.95  3.51  1302.04  3.55 
Storage (mil.  bu)  155.21  81.50  161.30  82.50  167.15  83.43 
Exports (mil. bu)  1046.78  19.31  1046.78  19.30  1047.60  19.32 
Acreage (mil.  bu)  38.90  1.01  38.90  1.01  38.90  1.01 
Production (mil. bu)  2351.17  12.20  2351.34  12.20  2351.51  12.19 
RW 
Price (S/bu)  3.88  17.36  3.88  17.64  3.88  17.88 
Consumption (mil. bu)  2224.41  4.98  2224.66  5.05  2224.88  5.11 
"Interest rate changes only in the US;  interest rate in the EU  is  held steady  at 7 percent. 
bFor base period (7  percent interest rate)  refer to Table 5. 27 
interest rate in the EU steady at 7 percent.  Results suggest that for every bushel decrease in US 
stocks.  the EU will increase its  stockholdings by  0.4 bushels. 
Figure  7  graphically  illustrates  the  shifts  in equilibrium  storage  rules  in  response  to 
increases in US  interest rates.  The figure shows that equilibrium stocks shift downward in the 
US  and upward in the EU when interest rates in the  US  alone  increase.  US  interest rate hikes 
restrain holding of buffer stocks and increase the volatility of commodity markets.  Grain stocks 
in the EU increase to compensate for less  US stocks.  The impact of higher US interest rates on 
price and other variables is  small. 
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Figure 7.  Equilibrium Storage Rules for the US and the EU Under 
Increasing Interest Rates in the US 28 
v.  PARMIETER"SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Sensitivity  analysis  of equilibrium  model  parameters  is  critical  for  establishing  the 
robustness of model results.  Demand and supply elasticities are key parameters and hence are 
of special concern.  In the following simulations demand and supply elasticities for the US and 
the  EU are changed jointly while the elasticity of demand in RW  is  held constant at  -0.31. 
A.  Sensitivity to Elasticity of Demand 
The  higher  the  price  elasticity  of demand,  the  lower the  marginal  propensity  to  hold 
stocks.  This is  because a more elastic or relatively  flat demand curve causes price  to  be less 
sensitive changes in supply, reducing the incentive for holding stocks.  With an elastic demand., 
consumers  absorb most of the  variation in production by  adjusting their consumption, making 
price stability provided by  storage less  necessary. 
Table 7 summarizes the steady state properties of price, consumption, storage, exports, 
acreage, and production under different demand elasticities.  The selected elasticities range from 
-0.1  to  -0.4.  The  table  indicates  that  storage  is  relatively  more  sensitive  than  are  other 
endogenous variables to  changes in demand elasticities.  For example,  mean storage decreased 
from  156 million bushels to  124 million bushels or 21  percent in response to an absolute value 
increase in elasticity from  -0.1 to  -0.4.  The coefficient of variation of stocks  increased from 
79 percent to  82  percent for a similar increase  in the elasticity of demand. 
The results indicate that US  exports increased by 50 million bushels or 4 percent when 
the elasticity of demand increased from -0.1 to  -0.4 (Table 7).  The changes  in the coefficient 
of variation of exports were small. 29 
Table 7.  Sensitivity to Demand and Supply Elasticities:  Steady State Mean and Coefficient of Variation (CV) of I)rice,  Conswllption, 
Storage, Exports, Acreage, and Production of Wheat in the  US~. 
Price  Consumption  Storage  Exports  Acreage  Production 
($/lm)  (mil.  hu)  (mil.  bu)  (mil.  bu)  (mil.  acre)  (mil.  bu) 
Demand Elasticity 
-0.1  Mean  3.36  1258.02  156.35  1170.67  60.71  2412.14 
CV (%)  21.26  2.76  79.06  17.41  0.70  12.18 
-0.2  Mean  3.38  1256.76  148.93  1177 .32  60.50  2437.91 
CV (%)  19.57  3.40  80.43  17.50  1.01  12.15 
-0.3  Mean  3.22  1179.81  134.22  1220.62  59.65  2403.40 
CV (%)  16.76  4.51  81.03  16.64  1.01  12.11 
-0.4  Mean  3.27  1191.39  124.11  1220.24  59.93  2414.69 
CV (%)  14.81  5.39  81.65  16.62  1.01  12.09 
Supply Elasticity 
0.1  Mean  3.65  1236.88  149.39  1146.52  59.22  2386.32 
CV (%)  21.63  3.78  78.04  17.47  0.91  12.04 
0.3  Mean  3.38  1256.76  148.93  1177.32  60.50  2437.91 
CV (%)  19.57  3.40  80.43  17.50  1.01  12.15 
0.5  Mean  3.37  1259.97  148.35  1182.35  60.69  2464.74 
CV (%)  19.37  3.31  80.46  17.70  1.01  12.16 
1.0  Mean  3:06  1282.80  147.83  1190.17  61.50  2478.13 
CV (%)  18.28  3.16  81.76  17.61  I. 11  12.31 
"Elasticity parameters are  identical for  both the  US and  the  ElJ and  change simultaneously in both the regions; elasticity of demand  in RW 
is  held constant at  -0.] I. 30 
As  expected,  the  higher the  price  elasticity  of demand  the  smaller  the  domestic  price 
instability.  For example, the coefficients of variation of price decreased from 21  percent to  15 
percent  in  response  to  an  increase  in  demand  elasticity  from  -0.1  to  -0.4 (Table  7).  The 
coefficient of variation of consumption in the US, on the other hand,  increased modestly (from 
3 to  5 percent) for a similar increase in demand elasticity. 
These simulations indicate that the  model results are  relatively  robust to  changes in the 
elasticity of demand.  In general,  the  magnitude of change in simulated results for changes  in 
price elasticity of demand was  small. 
A more liberalized market is generally associated with higher elasticities.  The results of 
this  study  suggest  that  a  more  liberalized  global  economy  will  face  lower  price  variability, 
reducing the need for buffer stocks.  Freer markets also encourage more trade and that trade is 
less volatile.  The CV of consumption increases modestly  in more open economies (Table 7). 
B.  Sensitivity to Elasticity of Supply 
Rational  stockholders  carry  forward  less  stock  if  they  expect  producers  to  increase 
production  in  response  to  higher  prices;  rational  producers  respond  to  future  production 
uncertainties  by  adjusting  the  planting  area.  The  supply  elasticity  detennines  the  degree  of 
flexibility  that  fanners  have  in  responding  to  future  expectations.  A  more  flexible  supply 
response substitutes for grain stocks.  Thus, as the supply elasticity increases, storage becomes 
less  important  as  responsive  production  complements  storage  in  stabilizing  prices  and 
consumption. 
Table 7 presents the steady state mean and coefficient of variation of price, consumption. 
storage,  exports,  acreage,  and  production of wheat  in the  US  for  selected  supply  elasticities 31 
ranging  from  0.1  to  1.0.  The  coefficient  of variation  of price  and  consumption  declines 
marginally as  the elasticity of supply  is  increased from 0.1 to  1.0.  The decline in steady state 
mean stockholding is  small.  The conclusion from  Table  7  is  that  means  and coefficients of 
variation of key variables are not highly responsive to changes in demand and supply elasticities 
within the ranges examined. 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
This study developed a structural model of the world wheat market consisting of the US, 
. the  EU,  and  a  combined  rest-of-the-world.  The  model. assesses  domestic  and  international 
linkages in  buffer stockholdings and trade of wheat in an efficient,  integrated global economy 
characterized by stochastic production in the US  and the EU.  RW is represented by a stochastic 
net demand function which accounts for both stochastic production and stochastic consumption 
in  RW.  The  rational  expectations  framework  was  used  to  incorporate  the  effects  of future 
uncertainty on stockholding behavior and on market prices.  The major findings of this study 
are summarized below. 
First, the results of the present study suggest an optimal wheat buffer stock level of 150 
million bushels in the US  if the coefficient of variation in production is  10 percent and discount 
factor  is  7  percent in both the  US  and  in the  EU.  This  level  will  change depending  on the 
domestic  and  foreign  level  of  production  instability,  supply,  interest  rates,  government 
commodity programs, and foreign stockholdings.  Adding pipeline stocks of 250 million bushels 
still leaves optimal US  carryover stocks of 400 million bushels,  well below stock levels of the 
1950s and 1960s under commodity programs.  However, the optimal buffer stock level increases 32 
to 262 million bushels if the discount factor is reduced to zero and CV of production is increased 
to  15 percent, which is approximately equal to the actual level of stocks held by the US in recent 
years (when pipeline stocks are added) but much lower than stocks of the 1950s and 1960s.  So 
it is possible to rationalize the recent levels of buffer stocks but not those of the 1950s and 1960s 
held for extended periods with help  from the CCC.  Reliance on private stocks alone is  likely 
to  result in more efficient buffer reserve  levels than did past government stockholdings. 
Second,  higher US  interest rates  reduce optimal US  wheat buffer stocks but could be 
compensated  by  the  increased  stock  levels  in  the  EU.  Results  predict that for  every  bushel 
decrease in US  stocks, the EU will increase its stocks by 0.4 bushels. 
Third,  results indicate that elimination of the  Export Enhancement Program by  the  US 
and export restitution payments by  the EU  is unlikely to have a major impact on wheat exports 
from the two regions,  but will  save  millions of dollars to  taxpayers in both the  regions.  Any 
decrease in exports is unlikely to markedly reduce market prices in the  US  because in the short 
run a large part of reduced exports will be held as  stocks. 
Fourth. each $1  cut from EEP on average would reduce US wheat producers' net income 
by  an estimated $0.69 to  $0.84 while  raising the  real  income of consumers by  $0.34 to $0.41 
and real national income by $0.58 to  $0.65.  Thus direct payments to producers would be more 
cost effective means than EEP to  raise US  farm income. 
The EU has held large stocks of wheat in some recent years.  But policy reforms of the 
EU as  well as  the US  have attempted to  reduce wheat stocks.  Global wheat stocks  at the end 
of the  1995/96 marketing year are expected to set record lows for recent decades.  The private 
sector is unlikely to hold much buffer stocks because the stockholding and marketing  intentions 33 
of the  US  and  ED public sectors are  unclear.  Thus during the  precarious transition currently 
underway to a more market oriented agriculture and liberalized trade, the government may need 
to  hold  at  least· a  modest  size  emergency  wheat  reserve  to  provide  a  backup  to  private 
stockholding. 
It  is  possible  that  risk  neutrality  and  other assumptions  of this  model  do  not  hold  in 
reality.  If consumers  are  highly  risk  averse,  then  the  private  sector alone  will  not  provide 
adequate wheat reserve stocks.  Other shortcomings of the model include failure to endogenize 
related sectors such as rice and coarse grains, and to account for other wheat producing nations 
such as  those in the. southern hemisphere diminishing the need for US  stocks. 34 
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